On the Current State of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Ben Shapiro has an interesting take on the current state of the Ukraine invasion, and what he perceives at the likely and/or necessary endgame for the war: https://twitter.com/benshapiro/status/1605899823491620866

Now, Shapiro is not a dumb person (even though he has plenty of viewpoints and opinions which I don't personally agree with), but this line of thinking exemplifies the idea that opinions are very often shaped by assumptions, and people can reach very different conclusions if they start with different assumptions (which may or may not be stated). In this case, Shapiro assumes that Ukraine cannot push Russia out of all of its territory (and/or that "defeating its invasion" is not inclusive of repelling Russia from all the territory which it has invaded, but only halting their advances). I don't know that either of those assumptions are accurate.

Moreover, I somewhat disagree with the premise, in concept. The interests of the US, in a geopolitical sense, are more along the lines of degrading Russia's military capability and identifying/exposing weaknesses in it. Both of these interests are fostered by allowing the conflict to continue as long as Ukraine is not losing (even if there is a stalemate in terms of territorial acquisition). Moreover, by supplying arms and logistical support to Ukraine, the US effectively increases progress toward those goals. I think fully repelling Russia's invasion attempt(s) serves a valuable purpose, but it would be a mistake to overlook the value in degrading their military capability in general, both in terms of functional capability and perception (ie: ability to achieve geopolitical goals through threats of force).

Now, one could argue that Shapiro is simply acting as a stooge for Russia in this instance, and his position is nothing more than serving that subservient interest, and while I cannot refute that speculation, I would suggest that a different set of assumptions might also lead to his conclusions. To wit, if we assume that Ukraine cannot succeed, and that the only goal of the US is to help them halt the invasion (as misstated by Shapiro initially), then his conclusions might be valid. Again, I don't think those assumptions are accurate, which is why my opinion is so materially different.

Additionally, and somewhat tangentially, I'd suggest that setting aside the human cost and considering only the military implications, the US has a strong interest in prolonging the conflict for as long as Ukraine continues to not lose significant territory. As a proxy method to degrade the Russian capabilities, Ukraine is a near-ideal battlefield situation, and we are undoubtedly learning many things from the real-world tests of not only the existing deployed technology, but also various NATO capabilities as they are incrementally deployed to the battlefield. I'd go as far as to say the US would be okay with Ukraine pushing into Russian territory as part of their counter-offensive, as a means to a strategical end.

Note that, per Russia's repeated threats, that action might provoke a nuclear response, but I don't think that actually need be a significant concern. Yes, Russia could attempt to strike anywhere at any time with nuclear weapons; this threat has persisted since the cold war, and is not likely to diminish any time soon. But the reality is that with every new threat, and every new use of nuclear strikes as a backstop to the reality of battlefield losses, the impact of those threats is diminished. Remember, Russia's doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for Russian territory which is attacked, and Russia has claimed parts of Ukraine which it doesn't even control as its territory, so in concept their use of nuclear weapons is currently allowed by their doctrine. But a persistent threat with no clear "red line", which is bandied about as a catch-all, loses a lot of its value in practice. Add to this the idea that if Russia was to launch a nuclear strike they would presumably immediately lose all remaining allies and be the "enemy" of the entire world, and the threat becomes something which is not really worth factoring in to potential actions. Yes, it's still there... it's just not important for the calculations.

I predict the US (and EU allies) continues to funnel money and training towards Ukraine, for as long as they continue to have battlefield success, and that by the fall of 2023 they will have a reasonably good chance of retaking substantially all of their territory. I predict that the US does not "tell Zelensky 'no'", as long as the Ukraine army continues to have battlefield success. And I predict the endgame is a negotiated treaty with effectively the pre-invasion borders (inclusive of Russia's invasion of Crimea), probably around the end of 2023.

That's my opinion, anyway.